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Mediation is a popular process to manage conflicts, but there is little systematic insight into 
its mechanisms. This paper discusses the results from an experiment in which a mediator can 
induce two conflict parties to behave cooperatively. If the mediator recommends cooperative 
behavior and threatens to punish deviations, she achieves the efficient solution. Similar results 
even obtain if the mediator is biased towards one party or has no incentive to prevent the 
conflict. Communication between the mediator and the conflict parties increases cooperation, 
even if punishment is impossible. However, when cooperation fails, communication without 
punishment leads to particularly low payouts for the ‘losing’ party.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Common  pool  resources  often  lead  to  conflicts  if  property  rights  are  not  established  and 
enforceable. Countries that are rich in oil and other natural resources often experience civil 
wars  and/or  get  poorer  over  time  (Van  der  Ploeg,  2009).  This  ‘resource  curse’  occurs 
predominantly  in  states  that  suffer  from  weak  institutions  (Mehlum  et  al.,  2006)  and/or 
fractionalization  in  society  (Van  der  Ploeg,  2009).  The  city  of  Kirkuk  in  northern  Iraq 
provides a prominent example. Different ethnic groups compete for its control. Nearby, there 
is substantial oil production that is not authorized by the central government in Baghdad. 
Conflicts over common resources also occur in many other fields, where agents can have 
opposing preferences, e.g. marital decision making, industrial relations, corporate mergers or 
international relations. Mediation is one of the most widespread techniques for preventing 
conflict  and  promoting  cooperation  (Kydd,  2006)  .  Restrictions  on  data  availability  and 
selection problems imply that we have little systematic knowledge about the mechanisms of 
mediation. Using data from an experiment, this paper provides clean evidence on the impact 
of mediators on conflict outcomes.  
There are many ways to prevent or solve conflicts. Negotiations between the different sides, 
sanctions against uncooperative behavior or the intervention of law enforcement agencies are 
potential solutions. Mediation is frequently used in situations where communication between 
agents  is  deficient  and  rigorous  enforcement  of  rules  is  impossible  or  very  expensive 
(Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992). Mediators act to restrain conflict behavior and try to induce 
cooperative solutions. e.g. in schools (Smith et al., 2002). In mediation processes, the conflict 
parties retain control over the outcome. A mediator has less power than an arbitrator who can 
impose a settlement.  
Miall et al. (1999) distinguish between pure mediation and mediation with muscles. In the 
former case, the mediator can only communicate with the conflict parties. A mediator with 
muscles can also provide some positive or negative inducements. The literature on conflict 
mediation has a long standing controversy about which type of mediator is more effective (I. 
Svensson,  2007).  Bercovitch  et  al.  (1991)  find  that  mediators  with  muscles  are  more 
successful  with  respect  to  international  conflicts.  According  to  Svensson  (2007)  this 
observation  holds  for  military  conflicts  in  particular,  but  not  necessarily  for  nonviolent 
conflicts about power sharing or territories. More importantly, he considers communication 
skills and coercive power as complementary tools. Montiel and Boehnke (2000) observe that 
people in developing societies prefer a pure mediators while people in rich countries prefer a 3 
 
mediator with muscles. They also find that men prefer a muscular mediator but women do no 
not. However, as Greig (2005) points out, almost all empirical investigations into mediation 
suffer from selection bias, as conflict parties do not decide randomly if they will accept a 
mediator.  Further  severe  empirical  problems  occur  when  researchers  attempt  to  compare 
different  conflicts,  since  most  mediation  processes  are  complex  and  key  variables  are 
unobservable.  Hence,  a  large  chunk  of  the  literature  is  rather  descriptive  and  uses  well 
documented case-studies to support their arguments. 
This  paper  uses  experimental  data  to  analyze  the  role  of  a  mediator  in  a  conflict.  The 
experimental approach allows for a standardized conflict scenario with controlled variations 
in the mediator’s power and her personal interests in the conflict. We focus on the preventive 
aspects of mediation. In our experiment two players faced a common pool problem. They 
could take out resources out of the pool over three rounds. The efficient solution was to leave 
the pool untouched all the time, but in the Nash equilibrium a rational selfish player empties 
the pool as early as possible. Differences in the economic interests of the subjects are the only 
cause of the conflict. We assigned subjects randomly to their specific role and we never 
revealed the identity of the other participants with whom they were interacting. Therefore, 
ideological,  political  or  personal  rivalries  between  the  players  do  not  provide  alternative 
explanations for conflict behavior in this setting.  
We compare the results from eight experimental treatments. Six treatments vary across two 
dimensions, mediator involvement and communication. Regarding mediator involvement, we 
look to see whether a third party (the mediator) can induce a better outcome than bilateral 
interaction between the conflict parties. Furthermore we investigate whether it is beneficial if 
this  third  party  can  sanction  uncooperative  behavior.  In  three  of  these  six  treatments  the 
parties  were  able  to  communicate  before  each  round.  In  the  other  three  treatments,  no 
communication was possible. Without a mediator the parties could communicate directly. If a 
mediator was present, this third player was able to communicate with each of the two other 
parties (who were not able to communicate between them). According to Carnevale and Choi 
(2000), this caucus approach of indirect communication is probably the most common tactic 
of mediation. It occurs in just about every context of mediation, e.g. in community mediation, 
labour-management  mediation  or  international  mediation.  Goltsman  et  al.  (2009)  show 
theoretically that this mediation approach can dominate direct negotiations if the level of 
conflict is rather high because mediators can filter and manipulate transmitted information. 
In treatments with a mediator, the third party received the average payout of the other two 
parties. She did not prefer one party over the other but she had a clear interest in realizing the 4 
 
efficient outcome. Two further treatments varied the interests of the third party in the conflict. 
In one treatment, the third party was not affected by the outcome of the conflict. In the other 
treatment she preferred one party over the other. In both of these treatments, the mediator was 
able to communicate and punish. 
The mediator in this experiment resembles, to some extent, a social planner with more or less 
powerful instruments: communication and punishment. It is well known that both instruments 
can serve as a coordination device. Early summaries of the literature by Falk et al (2001) or 
Ostrom et al. (1994) show that this holds in common pool games. Gardner et al. (1992) show 
that both institutions actually go hand in hand. Velez et al. (2006) provide similar results from 
field experiments in Columbia. Various studies confirm the effectiveness of communication 
for different types of games and different means of communication, e.g. Isaac and Walker 
(1988) Brosig et al. (2003), Brosig et al. (2004) or Harbring (2006). Bochet et al. (2006) show 
that communication in online chat rooms has a similar effect on voluntary contributions as 
face-to-face  communication.  Brandts  and  Cooper  (2007)  find  that  communication  has  a 
powerful function in coordination problems as they occur in firms with so-called weakest link 
or o-ring technologies (M. Kremer, 1993) which occur in many firms. 
Our experiment is similar to the one described by Brandts and Cooper (2007) as one party 
coordinates  the  two  others  which  make  the  actual  decisions  regarding  the  common  pool. 
These two parties cannot communicate directly. We deviate from Brandts and Cooper as the 
social optimum differs from the selfish interests of the two players. The pursuit of selfish 
strategies  induces  a  conflict  between  these  two  players.  As  a  further  difference  the 
coordinating  player  cannot  induce  cooperative  behavior  by  committing  herself  ex-ante  to 
reward cooperative behavior. All punishment decisions are made ex-post. The third party is 
therefore a mediator who intervenes because direct coordination between the two other parties 
is restricted. 
The  results  show  that  communication  reduced  the  average  withdrawals  significantly. 
However,  to  some  extent,  communication  is  an  ambivalent  mediation  instrument.  Losing 
parties in conflicts with communication received a significantly lower amount of money than 
losers in conflicts without communication. Punishment without communication also reduces 
the withdrawals but the actual costs of punishment destroy most of the gain in economic 
welfare. Communication increases the effectiveness of punishment. Both are complementary 
institutions. Many mediators used the communication to threaten punishment in the case of 
deviant  behavior.  It  turns  out  that  an  explicit  punishment  threat  at  the  beginning  of  the 5 
 
experiment is a very effective way to deter uncooperative behavior, even if it is just cheap 
talk. 
Variations in the mediator’s involvement in the conflict do not have a major impact on the 
results. A biased mediator is as successful as an impartial one. A mediator with no stakes in 
the conflict is almost as successful as an involved mediator. However, punishment threats are 
fewer and apparently less credible.  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follow.  We  present  the  experimental  design  in  the  following 
section, provide behavioral predictions in section 3, show the results in section 4 and conclude 
with a discussion. 
 
2  The experimental design 
 
All treatments in this experiment included a common pool game with two players, A and B. 
Over three rounds, these players could take (virtual) balls out of a (virtual) pool. Initially there 
were 20 balls in the pool. Every ball in the pool had a value which increased over time. In 
round 1 every ball taken out of the pool brought 1 point to the player who took the ball. In 
round 2 this benefit increased to 2 points, in round 3 it increased to 3 points. After round 3 
every ball had a value of 4 points. These remaining points were shared equally between the 2 
players. One point in this experiment exchanged into 0.40 Euros. The efficient solution is to 
leave the pool untouched. We speak of conflict whenever a player takes a ball from the pool 
in one of the three rounds. 
In each round each player could take out all the remaining balls. The pool was never refilled. 
As both player made their choice simultaneously it was possible that the sum of their choices 
exceeded  the  number  of  balls  in  the  pool.  In  this  case  the  following  sharing  rule  was 
implemented (with   denoting the number of balls in the pool,    denoting the choice of 
player A and    denoting the choice of player B). Player A receives 
   
        balls and player 
B receives 
   
        balls. If the resulting number of balls was not an integer it was rounded 
down.  
In six out of eight treatments, a third player C (the mediator) was involved in the common 
problem. These treatments varied the mediator’s power and her stakes in the conflict. In three 
treatments, player C could communicate with players A and B and withdraw points from each 
of  them  at  the  end  of  a  round  (punishment).  In  one  treatment  Player  C  (the  third  party) 
received the average payoff of players A and B at the end of the game. Since this mediator 6 
 
does  not  prefer  A  over  B,  we  call  her  an  impartial  mediator.  In  another  treatment,  the 
mediator was biased as she received 2/3 of player A’s payoff but only 1/3 of player B’s. In the 
third treatment, player C had no stakes in the conflict. She received a fixed payment of 40 
points irrespective of the conflict’s outcome. 
In three treatments the power of the (impartial) mediator was reduced. In one treatment, the 
mediator could only communicate with players A and B, in the other treatment could only 
punish A and B. In the third treatment, player C was a powerless bystander.  
We can compare these six treatments with the two additional setups, in which no mediator 
was present. Players A and B played the common-pool game without external interference. In 
this experiment, one treatment allowed for direct communication between the conflict parties. 
In the other treatment without mediator, player A and B could not communicate with each 
other. 
Communication  took  place  before  each  round  via  free  form  chat-boxes  only.  Each 
communication interval lasted for five minutes. In the treatments with mediator, player C sent 
identical messages to players A and B before round 1. Players A and B were not able to send 
message  to  C  at  that  stage.  These  opening  statements  provide  clean  evidence  about 
heterogeneity in the communication behavior among the subjects in the role of player C. 
Before rounds 2 and 3, player C could chat with players A and B in separate boxes. In these 
treatments players A and B were not able to communicate directly.  
In the communication treatment without mediator, players A and B wrote messages to each 
other before round 1. After five minutes these messages were transmitted to the respective 
other player. The players had 90 seconds time to read the messages but no chance to reply to 
each other. Before rounds 3, players A and B could chat freely with each other. 
In the treatments with punishment, Player C could reduce the points of player A and/or Player 
B after each round. The maximum possible reduction was the number of points the respective 
player had acquired up to that point. For an  impartial mediator, the reduction of 1 point 
implied effective costs of 0.5 points. The reduction of the payoff of one player reduced the 
average number of points of both players and the impartial mediator received this average 
payoff at the end of the game. Compared with other experiments this is relatively costly. For 
the biased mediator, a reduction of one point of player A’s (B’s) payoff implied a cost of 
0.667 (0.333) points. The player C with no stakes did not receive the average of players A and 
B. To ensure comparability between the treatments, she had to pay 0.5 points for each point 
withdrawn. After each round all players received full information about takeouts, the current 
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Procedural Details.  
The experiment was computerized with the software “z-Tree” (U. Fischbacher, 2007). The 
recruitment was conducted with the software “ORSEE” (B. Greiner, 2004). Subjects were 
students  from  the  University  of  Konstanz,  Psychology  students  were  not  eligible  to 
participate. All sessions took place at the University of Konstanz. 323 subjects participated in 
the experiment, 51 each in the treatments noC/P and noC/noP, 42 each in the treatments C/P 
and C/noP and 24 in the baseline treatment. No subject took part in more than one session. 
Subjects were randomly assigned a role as player A, B, or C upon arrival at the lab. They 
received  written  instructions  including  comprehension  questions  that  had  to  be  answered 
correctly. A summary of the instructions was read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the 
game. All treatments were framed in a neutral manner. 
Sessions without communication lasted for about 60 minutes; sessions with communication 
for about 80 minutes. Each experimental point was converted into 0.4 € (about $0.5 at that 
time) at the end of the experiment. Additionally, each subject received a show up fee of 4 €. 
 
3  Behavioral Predictions 
 
We identify conflict by observing if either player A or player B or both take balls from the 
pool. Two criteria help to evaluate a conflict and a mediator’s success in conflict prevention: 
the combined payoffs of A and B (efficiency, denoted by   ) and the difference in their 
payoffs (inequality, denoted by   ). Successful conflict prevention therefore maximizes the 
cumulative  payoffs  of  the  conflict  parties  and  minimizes  the  differences  between  them. 
Conventional  economic  theory  predicts  a  complete  failure  of  conflict  prevention  in  all 
treatments. In the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium selfish rational players will choose to 
take all balls in round 1 in any treatment. Player C will never punish. Communication has no 
impact on the outcome. Results from previous studies suggest that such a worst case scenario 
will not occur. We derive predictions regarding the efficiency and the inequality in  conflict 
outcomes. Furthermore we predict how the interests of the mediator shape the results of a 
conflict. 
 
Predictions regarding efficiency 
It is well known communication and punishment induces participants to cooperate. (e.g. Falk 
et al (2001), Ostrom et al. (1994)). Therefore players A and B should withdraw less balls and 
do so later in the game. 9 
 
 
Prediction 1: Communication increases the combined payoff of A and B. 
Prediction 2: If a mediator can punish uncooperative behavior, the combined payoff of A and 
B increases. 
 
Since Gardner et al. (1992), Svensson (2007) and Velez et al. (2006) show that punishment 
and communication go hand in hand, we can make a third prediction. 
 
Prediction  3:  A  combination  of  communication  and  punishment  provides  the  highest 
combined payoff for A and B. 
 
Prediction 1 suggests the following relationship between payoffs   in the treatments without a 
mediator: 
                       . 
Predictions 1 to 3 also provide a ranking regarding   in the treatments with an impartial 
mediator: 
                                             . 
 
In  the  comparable  treatment  with  indirect  communication  via  the  mediator  (C/noP),  the 
conflicting  parties  cannot  send  signals  about  their  future  behavior  before  round  1. 
Furthermore  a  direct  communication  between  the  conflict  parties  is  impossible.  In  the 
treatment without the mediator C/noM the parties can send direct signal.  
 
Prediction 4: Direct communication between the conflict parties provides a higher combined 
payoff than indirect communication via the mediator. 
 
In treatment noC/noP the mediator cannot communicate or punish. Sheis a passive by-stander. 
In this case we do not expect that she has an impact on the behavior of the participants. 
 
Prediction  5:  A  passive  mediator  has  no  impact  on  the  combined  payoff  of  the  conflict 
parties. 
 
Predictions 1, 4 and 5 imply the following relationship between payoffs   in the treatments 
with and without a mediator: 10 
 
                                               . 
 
Predictions regarding inequality 
 
Predictions 1 to 5 focus on the efficiency of allocations. Now the focus is on the inequality in 
outcomes, denoted by   . Brandts and Cooper (2007) observe that some subjects induce a 
cooperative behavior by promising a high payment but they do not honor their promise. This 
can happen also in our experiment as communication allows each conflict party to reassure 
the other side about its own willingness to cooperate. Therefore many subjects will not take 
from the pool and some other subjects will exploit this behavior by taking from the pool 
anyway, particularly in round 3. If the mediator can punish, fewer subjects will exploit. 
 
Prediction  6:  In  the  treatments  with  communication  but  without  punishment  (C/noP  and 
C/noM) the inequality in outcome is higher than in treatments without communication and 
treatments with punishment.  
 
Prediction 6 implies the following relationships  
   for treatments with a mediator 
                                 ; 
   for treatments without a mediator 
                       . 
 
Predictions regarding a change in the interests of the mediator 
 
Finally we look at the behavior in the treatments in which the mediator is either biased or has 
no stakes in the conflict. If the mediator is biased any punishment threat in direction of player 
A is less credible. Punishment threats by a mediator without any stake are even less credible. 
A  lower  credibility  should  have  an  impact  on  both  efficiency  and  inequality.  A  lower 
credibility implies that possibility of punishment has a lower impact on the behavior. 
 
Prediction 7: A biased mediator will achieve a lower overall payoff than an impartial one but 
a higher one than a mediator without stakes in the conflict. 
 11 
 
Prediction  7  implies  the  following  relationship  between  combined  payoffs  across  the 
treatments: 
                                   
 
                      . 
 
Prediction 8: A biased mediator leads to a higher inequality in payoffs than an impartial one 
but to a lower one than a mediator without stakes in the conflict.  
 
Prediction  8  implies  the  following  relationship  between  differences  in  payoffs  across  the 
treatments: 
                                                         
 
 
4  Results 
 
We present results for each of the 8 predictions. The first focus is on efficiency, after that the 
analysis concentrates on the inequality in outcomes. Finally, we provide detailed information 
on the impact of communication on the results. All reported p-values refer to the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test if not stated otherwise. 
Efficiency 
 
Figure 2 shows the overall performance (payoff) of A and B across the different treatment 
groups after punishment (net performance). These numbers reflect the success of conflict 




Figure 2: Overall performance of A and B after punishment across the “power” treatments 
(in points) 
 
We can confirm prediction 1, as the treatments without communication provide the lowest 
welfare. According to the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the difference between treatments noC/P 
and C/noP is highly significant (p = .0019). However, the performance differences between 
all groups without communication (noC/P, noC/noM and noC/noP) are not significant which 
confirms prediction 5 but contradicts prediction 2.  
The high cost of punishment cause the rejection of prediction 2. With punishment players A 
and B were more cooperative (p = .0453 for the comparison of pre punishment earnings 
between noC/P and noC/noP) but the impact of punishment reduced welfare. Punishment is 
only  welfare  increasing  if  it  is  linked  with  communication.  The  performance  difference 
between noC/P and C/P is highly significant (p = .0000). A powerful mediator also dominates 
direct communication between the conflict parties (Treatment C/P compared with C/noM, p = 
.0149).  The  results  suggest  that  communication  and  punishment  are  complementary 
institutions. 
Interestingly, prediction 4 cannot be confirmed. Indirect communication via the mediator is 
not a significantly worse mechanism than direct communication between the conflict parties. 
Variations in the mediator’s involvement have little impact on the conflict’s overall outcome 
(Prediction  7).  The  net  performance  in  all  three  treatments  with  communication  and 















treatment  C/P  players  A  and  B  would  have  had  a  higher  welfare  than  in  the  No  Stakes 
treatment (p = .0512), but the larger punishment costs reduce this benefit. 
 
Inequality of Outcomes 
 
So far, the analysis has focused on the efficiency of the final allocation. Now it focuses on 
distributional aspects, in particular the outcome for a “loser” in a conflict. The experiment 
reveals that communication has a detrimental effect for some conflict parties (which confirms 
prediction 6). 
Table 2 shows that conflict occurs more frequently in treatments without communication. 
However,  increased  cooperation  in  treatments  without  punishment  (C/noM  and  C/noP) 
induces  some  subjects  to  exploit  the  other  conflict  party  in  round  3.  Therefore,  conflicts 
become asymmetric- Once a conflict occurs, the payoff differences between the two conflict 
parties  are  larger  in  these  treatments  than  in  the  treatments  without  communication  and 
punishment (noC/noM and noC/noP; all p-values are lower than .1). Likewise, the losing 
party  in  a  conflict,  i.e.  the  party  with  a  lower  payoff,  is  worse  off  in  a  conflict  with 
communication  but  without  punishment  (again  the  p-values  are  at  least  lower  than  .1). 
Furthermore cooperating players are more likely to get nothing out of the pool if they are in 
the treatments without punishment (C/noM and C/noP). The Gini coefficients also show that 
communication  without  punishment  leads  to  uneven  payments  if  a  conflict  occurs.  If 
punishment is possible, communication does not have this detrimental effect. 
Compared with treatment noC/noP, the results also show that a mediator with no stakes in the 
conflict induces a larger inequality in payoffs once a conflict occurs (p = .065, prediction 8). 
However,  the  loser  in  a  conflict  is  not  significantly  worse  off.  A  comparison  with  the 
treatments C/P and C/P Bias also indicates that a mediator with no stakes induces some 
subjects to exploit the others (Prediction 8). Since the impartial and biased mediators are so 
successful in preventing conflicts, a meaningful statistical comparison of conflict outcomes is 
impossible. Interestingly, the Bias treatment does not lead to disadvantages for player B. On 
average, Player B is not worse off than player A and the mediators’ statements do not suggest 
any major difference. 
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Table 2: Conflict frequency and asymmetry across the treatments 





Treatment  C/noM  noC/noM 
Share of conflicts among observations  57.14 %  91.67% 
Conflict asymmetry†  35.00  12.55 
Payoff for the ‘Loser’‡  7.50  15.45 
Incidents of complete exploitation*  5  0 




Treatment  C/noP  noC/noP 
Share of conflicts among observations  61.54%  100% 
Conflict asymmetry†  44.25  14.41 
Payoff for the ‘Loser’‡  8.00  14.12 
Incidents of complete exploitation*  6  1 
Gini coefficient in case of conflict  .494  .266 
Mediator 
(Punishment) 
Treatment  C/P  noC/P 
Share of conflicts among observations  14.29%  100% 
Conflict asymmetry†  30.00  25.35 
Payoff for the ‘Loser’‡  18.50  12.82 
Incidents of complete exploitation*  1  3 
Gini coefficient in case of conflict  .336  .375 
Mediator 
(Biased) 
Treatment  C/P bias 
 
Share of conflicts among observations  35,.71% 
Conflict asymmetry†  23.60 
Payoff for the ‘Loser’‡  20.60 
Incidents of complete exploitation*  1 
Gini coefficient in case of conflict  .291 
Mediator 
(No Stakes) 
Treatment  C/P no stakes 
Share of conflicts among observations  46.67% 
Conflict asymmetry†  41.43 
Payoff for the ‘Loser’‡  10.57 
Incidents of complete exploitation*  4 
Gini coefficient in case of conflict  .432 
† Average payoff differences between the conflict parties in case of a conflict before punishment is deducted 
‡ Average minimum payoff for a participant in case of conflict. 





The previous analysis has shown that both direct communication between the conflict parties 
as well as indirect induces some people to leave the pool untouched. This power of persuasion 
is particularly transparent in the single group in which the mediator recommended a behavior 
which was not welfare maximizing. This incident occurred in treatment C/P bias. Player B 
had taken 1 ball in round 1, such that 19 balls remained in the pool. Before round 2, the 
mediator recommended that each player leaves the pool untouched in round 2 and that each 
player takes 9 balls in round 3, with 1 ball remaining in the pool. The other players reminded 
the mediator that the recommended strategy is not welfare maximizing but they did not insist 
on their opinion. In consequence, the mediator successfully convinced each player to behave 
in the proposed way by reassuring them that the respective other player will also follow the 
recommendation. Ex post it becomes obvious that the indirect communication harmed players 
A and B because both players agreed to follow a recommended strategy. 
Other subjects exploited the cooperation induced by the mediator and took all balls out of the 
pool in round 3. In most cases, these participants made misleading promises about cooperative 
behavior. In treatments with a punishment possibility, a threat of punishment by the mediator 
deterred these exploiters. In all treatments with communication and punishment, the subjects 
did not empty the pool when the mediator threatened punishment in the opening statement. 
Such threats occurred in 11 out of 14 cases in treatment C/P, in 7 out of 14 cases in treatment 
C/P Bias, but only in 4 out of 15 cases in treatment C/P No Stakes.  
Finally, it is also interesting that the mediator can substitute direct communication between 
the  two  conflict  parties.  In  the  treatment  with  direct  communication,  almost  all  subjects 
promised  to  leave  the  pool  untouched.  Most  mediators  used  their  opening  statement  to 
recommend the same cooperative behavior. Recall that this opening message was a uniform 
message from player C to players A and B without feedback. Nevertheless, the mediators 
achieve almost the same result on the conflict outcome, even in round 1, when the conflict 
parties had no chance to indicate their prospective behavior to the other side. Table 3 shows 




Table 3: Share of subjects who take ball from the pool in round 1 
 




















9.52%   
Mediator (No Stakes) 
C/P No Stakes 
0%   
 
5  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated the intervention of third parties in common pool games with two 
players. The treatments groups varied the powers and interests of the third party. The results 
show  that  third  party  intervention  is  effective.  In  particular,  the  combination  of 
communication and punishment induces the efficient solution in most cases . This result holds 
even  if  the  mediator  is  biased  towards  one  party  or  her  payoff  does  not  depend  on  the 
conflict’s  outcome.  Punishment  alone  is  not  welfare  improving  though  this  reflects  the 
relatively high costs of punishment for the third party in this experiment. Communication 
contains some ambiguity. Once players deviate they empty the entire pool leaving cooperative 
players  worse  off  than  in  treatments  without  communication.  Such  behavior  occurs  most 
frequently in situations when the mediator cannot or does not threaten punishment.  
The American President Theodore Roosevelt once summarized his foreign policy strategy in 
the phrase "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick". The results of this paper suggest that this is a 17 
 
good recommendation for conflict mediators too, since punishment alone and communication 
alone are not as effective as the combination of both. After all, Roosevelt was a successful 
mediator himself. In 1906, he won the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the peace in the 
Russo-Japanese War. 
This appraisal of realpolitik should not deny that punishment will remain a controversial 
factor in a mediation process. In this experiment, punishment was a well targeted economic 
sanction against an uncooperative agent. In many conflicts mediators may use tools that are 
more blunt. In this case, punishment may harm innocent bystanders rather than the deviant 
person. The use of military force is an obvious example. Even economic sanctions may harm 
ordinary citizens but not their ruthless dictator. In divorce cases children may suffer because 
the mediator acts against one parent. Potential ‘collateral damages’ are likely to affect both 
the effectiveness and the ethics of punishment. 
It may surprise some readers that the mediator is fairly successful in many treatments. The 
comparison between mediated and direct negotiation and the effectiveness of mediators with 
no stake or a bias in the conflict seem encouraging for intervening third parties. Apart from 
punishment, the mediator in this experiment provided costless, but valuable services. Not only 
did she inform each party about the messages of the other one. The coordination effects of the 
opening statements show that the mediator became a moral authority of a sort. These services 
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Appendix: Instructions (Translated from German into English) 
 
Notes for readers: These instructions are for participants of type C (i.e. the mediators) in the 
C/P  treatment,  i.e.  with  communication  and  punishment.  The  mediator  is  impartial.  We 
highlight the differences in the following way: 
   Instructions which are specific for the communication treatments (C/P and C/noP) are 
written in italics.  
   Instructions which are specific for the punishment treatments (C/P and noC/P) are 
underlined.  
   Bold  letters  are  derived  from  the  instructions  in  German  and  emphasize 
important information for the participants. 




General Instruktions for Participants 
 
 
Welcome to our economic experiment 
Please read the following instructions carefully. You receive 4 Euros for your participation 
in  this  experiment.  Depending  on  the  decisions  of  you  and  the  other  participants  in  this 
experiment, you may receive additional payments. Therefore we recommend to study these 
instructions in detail. If you have any question, please contact us before the experiment starts. 
You must not talk with other participants during the experiment.  Otherwise  you  are 
excluded from the experiment and receive no payments at all. 
During the experiment we talk about points instead of Euros. At first, all your revenues are 
calculated in points. We exchange the final score into Euros at the end of the experiment. The 
exchange rate is 
1 Point = 40 Eurocents. 
At the end of this experiment, you receive payments for all your received points and the 4 
Euros for participation in cash. 




There are three types of participants in this experiment: A, B, and C. The participants will be 
matched in groups of three, such that each group contains one participant of each type. All 
participants remain anonymous. Group matching occurs randomly at the beginning of the 
experiment. We will never reveal the identities of any member of any group. 
The experiment is set up as follows. At first, a lottery assigns you to a group of three members 
who remain anonymous. In this group, you are participant C. The experiment includes three 
stages.  You  are  always  a  participant  C  and  you  remain  in  this  group  during  the  entire 
experiment. 
Now  we  explain  the  different  stages  of  the  experiment.  Please  read  carefully  as  these 
instructions inform you about your decision possibilities and their impact on your payout. If 
you have any question, please ask before the experiment starts! 
 
The stages of the Experiment: 
 
Communikation 
The  experiment  has  three  stages  or  rounds.  In  each  stage,  participants  A  and  B  make  a 
decision. (For communication treatments only:) Ahead of each decision communication via 
an online chat is possible. Please do not reveal your identity during communication. Your 
identifier in communication is “Participant C”. We put some restrictions on communication 
as you can see below: 
 
Communication before round 1: 
You can send messages to participants A and B which may contain your considerations about 
the game. These messages are identical for both participants for A and B. Both cannot answer 
you. If you want to send a message, please type in your text and press the ‘Enter’-key. 
Communication before round 2: 23 
 
You can chat with participants A and B in separate chat boxes. By now, A and B can send you 
messages  too.  Both  boxes  are  independent  of  each  other.  Participants  A  and  B  cannot 
communicate directly with each other. If you want to send a message, please type in your text 
and press the ‘Enter’-key. Communication before round 3 is structured in the same way. 
 
Your decisions 
In this experiment, participants A and B can withdraw balls from an pool. Balls and pools are, 
of course, virtual. The pool contains 20 balls at the beginning of the experiment. In each of 
the three rounds, participants A and B can decide how many balls they want to take out of the 
pool. The pool will not be refilled after a round. Each withdrawn ball remains outside with 
the participant who took it. 
In each round, each participant can take as many balls as the pool contains in this round. Both 
participants  decide  simultaneously  without  any  information  about  the  decision  of  the 
respective other person. 
Of course, the sum of the withdrawn balls cannot exceed the number of balls in the pool. If 
the sum of the intended withdrawals exceeds the number of balls in the pool, the following 
division rule applies. The share for participant A is her intended withdrawal divided by the 
sum  of  both  intended  withdrawals.  Likewise  the  share  for  participant  B  is  her  intended 
withdrawal divided by the sum of both intended withdrawals.  
Only entire balls can be withdrawn. If the allotted share is not an integer, it is always round 
down. Therefore, excessive intended withdrawal can imply that the sum of actual withdrawals 
is smaller than the number of balls previously in the pool. In this case one ball is lost. 
The following example may clarify the withdrawing procedure: 
Suppose the experiment is in round three. In the previous rounds 16 balls hwere withdrawn 
altogether. 4 balls remain in the pool. Participant A wants to withdraw 3 balls, participant B 2 
balls. Altogether they want to withdraw 5 balls which exceeds the number of balls in the pool. 
The balls are divided as follows:  
Participant A wanted to take 3 balls which is equivalent to 60% of the sum of intended 
withdrawals (3+2 = 5). Therefore she gets 60% of the remaining 4 balls, i.e. 2.4 balls. Since 
2.4. is not an integer, she will get only 2 balls. 24 
 
Participant B wanted to take 2 balls which is equivalent to 40% of the sum of intended 
withdrawals. Therefore he gets 40% of the remaining 4 balls, i.e. 1.6 balls. Since 1.6 is not an 
integer, he will get only 1 balls. Overall, one ball is lost. 
 
The value of the balls 
 
Every withdrawn ball transfers points to the withdrawing person. The value per ball changes 
every round. Every ball withdrawn in round 1 transfers 1 point. Every ball withdrawn in 
round 2 transfers 2 points and every ball withdrawn in round 3 transfers 3 points. After round 
3, all remaining balls in the pool have a value of 4 points. These points are equally divided 
between players A and B.  
Table: Value of balls in each round of the experiment 
Round  Value per withdrawn ball 
Round 1  1 point 
Round 2  2 points 
Round 3  3 points 
After Round 3  4 points 
(These  points  are  divided  equally 
between A and B) 
  
Participant C 
You  are  a  participant  C.  You  cannot  withdraw  balls  from  the  pool.  (For  punishment 
treatments only:) After each round you can take points away from participants A and B. These 
points will be lost, you cannot transfer them to your own account. You cannot take more 
points than the respective participant owns at the moment, You do not have to take points 
away. 25 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the average payout of participants A and B. If, 
for example, participant A has 17 points at the end of the experiment and participant B has 22 
points, you will receive 19.5 points. 
 
Examples: 
Here  you  have  two  examples  which  show  you  how  the  experiment  proceeds.  (For 
communication treatments only:) Communication is not considered in these examples. The 
numbers in the example are chosen arbitrarily. 
Example 1 
Round 1: There are 20 balls in the pool. Participant A wants to take 1 ball. Participant B 
wants to take 2 balls. 17 balls remain in the pool. Participant A has 1 point, participant B 2 
points. 
(For punishment treatments only:) Participant C takes 1 point away from participant A, such 
that participant A has 0 points. Participant B can keep his 2 points. 
 
Round 2: Now, there are 17 balls in the pool. Participant A wants to take 4 balls. Participant B 
also  wants  to  take  4  balls.  9  balls  remain  in  the  pool.  Participant  A  receives  8  point, 
participant  B  also  receives  8  points  and  has  now  10  points.  (The  scores  are  adjusted 
accordingly in the non-punishment treatments)  
(For punishment treatments only: ) Participant C takes no points away. 
 
Round 3: Now, there are 9 balls in the pool. Participant A wants to take 3 balls. Participant B 
wants to take 2 balls. 4 balls remain in the pool. Participant A receives 9 points (3*3) and has 
now 17 points (8+9), participant B receives 6 points (2*3) and has now 16 points (10+6). 4 
balls remain in the pool. Their value (4*4 points) is divided equally between A and B, each of 
them receiving 8 points. Altogether, participant A has 25 points (8 + 9 + 8). Participant B has 
24  points  (2  +  8  +  6  +  8;  The  scores  are  adjusted  accordingly  in  the  non-punishment 
treatments)  
(For punishment treatments only:) Participant C takes 1 point away from participant A, such 
that participant A has 24 points. Participant C takes 4 points away from participant B, such 
that participant B has 20 points.  




Round 1: There are 20 balls in the pool. Participant A wants to take 7 balls. Participant B 
wants to take 6 balls. 7 balls remain in the pool. Participant A has 7 points, participant B 6 
points. 
(For punishment treatments only: ) Participant C takes no points away. 
 
Round 2: Now, there are 7 balls in the pool. Participant A wants to take 5 balls. Participant B 
wants to take 7 balls. The participants want to take out more balls than the pool contains. The 
remaining balls have to be shared. 
Overall, the participants wanted to take out 12 balls. Participant A wanted 5 balls which 
implies a share 41.67 balls (5/12). Participant B wanted 7 balls which implies a share 58.33 
balls (7/12). With 7 balls remaining in the pool, A receives 2 balls (0.4167 * 7 = 2.917, this 
result will be round down to 2). B receives 4 balls (0.5833 * 7 = 4.083, this result will be 
round down to 2). 1 ball is lost. Hence, A gets 4 points (2*2) and 11 points in total. B gets 8 
points and has 14 points in total. 
(For punishment treatments only: ) Again, participant C takes no points away. 
 
Round 3: 
Now, there are 0 balls in the pool. No player can withdraw any ball. Participant A has 11 
points, participant B 14 points. 
(For punishment treatments only:) Participant C takes 4 point away from participant A, such 
that participant A has 7 points. Participant C takes no points away from participant B, such 
that participant A has 14 points.  
The average payout is 10.5 points. Participant C will receive 10.5 points. (The scores are 
adjusted accordingly in the non-punishment treatments)  
 
You have further questions? 
 
Procedure at the Computer 
The experiment starts in round 1. (only in communication treatments:) You can send messages 27 
 
to participants A and B for 5 minutes. These participants cannot respond. If you want to send 
a message, type the text and press the ‘Enter’-key. 
 
The following picture shows the chat box. Write your messages in the field sown on the left 
side. 
 
Afterwards,  participants  A  and  B  decide  how  many  balls  they  want  to  withdraw.  The 
experiment continues once all participants have made their decisions. 
You  will  be  informed  about  the  decisions  of  participants  A  and  B.  (only  in  punishment 
treatments:) You can decide if, and how many points you want to take from participant A and 
from participant B. You do not have to write a number. Please press the OK button after you 
have made your decision (see following picture). 28 
 
 
Afterwards you proceed to round 2. Participants A and B will receive information about the 
scores. (only in communication treatments:) You can chat with participants A and B for 5 
minutes. Two separate chat boxes are available. A and B cannot communicate directly with 
each other (see picture below) 
If you want to send a message to participant A, use the left box, write your message and press 
the ‘Enter’-key.  
If you want to send a message to participant B, use the right box, write your message and 





Now the participants A and B decide how many balls they want to withdraw. The experiment 
continues once all participants have made their decisions. 
You  will  be  informed  about  the  decisions  of  participants  A  and  B.  (only  in  punishment 
treatments:) You can decide if, and how many points you want to take from participant A and 
from participant B. You do not have to write a number. Please press the OK button after you 
have made your decision (see following picture). 
 
Afterwards you proceed to round 3. Participants A and B will receive information about the 
scores. (only in communication treatments:) You can chat with participants A and B for 5 
minutes. Two separate chat boxes are available. A and B cannot communicate directly with 
each other (see picture below) 
If you want to send a message to participant A, use the left box, write your message and press 
the ‘Enter’-key.  
If you want to send a message to participant B, use the right box, write your message and 
press the ‘Enter’-key. 
Now the participants A and B decide how many balls they want to withdraw. The experiment 30 
 
continues once all participants have made their decisions. 
You  will  be  informed  about  the  decisions  of  participants  A  and  B.  (only  in  punishment 
treatments:) You can decide if, and how many points you want to take from participant A and 
from participant B. You do not have to write a number. Please press the OK button after you 
have made your decision (see following picture). 
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